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INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE 
Amicus Curiae David F. Forte, a graduate of Harvard College, with a Ph.D from the 
University of Toronto and JD. from the Columbia School of Law, is a law professor at the 
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. I have taught law for nearly forty years since I ﬁrst joined 
the law school as an Associate Professor in 1976. I served as Associate Dean for Academic 
Affairs at the law school from 1986-1988, and was the inaugural Charles R. Emrick, Jr./Calfee, 
Halter & Griswold Endowed Professor of Law at Cleveland-Marshall from 2004-2007. I am a 
lawyer in good standing in the State of Ohio. 
My primary teaching competencies include Constitutional Law, the First Amendment, 
Islamic Law, Jurisprudence, Natural Law, International Law, International Human Rights, and 
Constitutional History. I write and speak nationally on topics such as constitutional law, 
religious liberty, Islamic law, the rights of families, and international affairs. I served as book 
review editor for the American Journal of Jurisprudence and am Senior Editor of The Heritage 
Guide to the Constitution (2006), 2d edition (2014), published by Regnery & Co, a clause-by- 
clause analysis ofthe Constitution ofthe United States. 
During the Reagan administration, I served as chief counsel to the United States 
delegation to the United Nations and alternate delegate to the Security Council. I have sat as 
acting judge on the municipal court of Lakewood, Ohio and chaired the Professional Ethics 
Committee of the Cleveland Bar Association. I have authored a number of briefs before the 
United States Supreme Court, and I was among several academics to join an amicus brief in the 
recent Noel Canning case at the United States Supreme Court, regarding the legitimacy of 
President Obama’s recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board.
I have chosen to participate as an amicus curiae in support of the Motion for 
Reconsideration filed by Appellants Robert E. Murray, Murray Energy Corporation, American 
Energy Corporation, and The Ohio Valley Coal Company because as a career constitutional 
scholar, I believe that Appellants’ case presents questions of keen interest to the bench and bar 
that merit this Court's attention. The interest that Appellants’ appeal garnered from multiple 
amici curiae and from the press is no accident -— the case indeed presents a notable package of 
First Amendment issues worthy of this Court's review. In Ohio, where civil jury trials are 
becoming ever fewer and farther between, this appeal presents important questions 
concerning the tension between: (1) the freedom of the press; (2) the respect for the role of the 
jury, and (3) the compelling interests we all share in having access to meaningful judicial 
remedies for reputational harms, where demonstrably false assertions of fact have been 
published due to reporting or editorial commentary that a reasonable jury might find reckless 
and notjust negligent. 
Here, although I express no opinion on the merits of Appellants’ claims for false—light 
invasion of privacy or defamation, I share Appellants’ concern about the manner in which their 
non-frivolous claims were wrested from a jury just before trial. The trial court's ”postcard" 
decision troubles me in light of the substantial summary-judgment record submitted by the 
parties. Such short shrift paid by the trial court fails to educate the parties or their counsel 
about the basis for removing the case from the jury. Nor does it facilitate meaningful appellate 
review of the underlying facts of the case, particularly given the voluminous record developed 
after substantial discovery. If a trial judge concludes that summaryjudgment is appropriate in a 
significant contested case such as this that implicates substantial constitutional questions, then
he or she should explain the basis for that conclusion. As I will explain below, an explanation of 
the manner in which the trial court examined the parties’ submissions against the requisite 
burden of proof would have been particularly useful in light of the US. Supreme Court's Liberty 
Lobby decision — cited by Appellees to oppose discretionary review — which announced a new 
standard for trial courts to follow in this context without elaborating on how they are to do so. 
If a lack of time to draft meaningful decisions is the culprit for "postcard” summary-judgment 
decisions, then allowing a jgy (instead of the overburdened judge) to sort through and decide 
disputed facts seems all the more appropriate for both practical and constitutional reasons — 
not to mention those compelled by Civil Rule 56. 
The Eighth District's Opinion affirming the trial court's decision is also concerning. The 
panel largely ignored certain evidence presented by Appellants that would seem to present 
disputes of material fact on their defamation claim. Such evidence included, but was not 
limited to, an expert report by Professor Joel Kaplan, a respected journalist, academic, and 
ombudsman who opined that Appellees deviated from accepted standards of journalism. The 
Eighth District also failed to address materials suggesting that one or more of the Appellees 
harbored ill will toward Mr. Murray and his companies — an issue this Court has previously 
deemed relevant (though not determinative) to actual malice. It is difficult to instruct my law 
students about how to proffer evidence to survive a dispositive motion in a defamation case if 
trial courts and courts of appeal will so quickly bypass an expert report such as the one 
submitted here by Professor Kaplan, without bothering to address its substance, and without 
permitting a properly instructed jury to weigh the evidence.
For the reasons described more fully below, although I share the Eighth District panel's 
fundamental respect for the freedom of the press — a respect compelled by binding precedent 
from this Court and the U.S. Supreme Court as well as our people's long-standing traditions —I 
also share Appellants’ concern that decisions such as the one below marginalize the critical role 
of the jury and threaten to leave without a chance at fair adjudication those injured plaintiffs 
who proffer substantial, credible evidence supporting non-frivolous claims of defamation. 
Ohio can still protect the freedom of the press while allowing juries to resolve disputed 
facts, but decisions such as the one appealed here may marginalize the critical role that juries 
have had in effectuating the rule of law from the time our nation first began. (See, e.g., the 
claim against the King: "For depriving us in many cases, of the beneﬁts of Trial by Jury,” The 
Declaration of Independence para. 20 (U.S. 1776), and the protection ofjuries in civil trials: ’’In 
Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of 
trial byjury shall be preserved...” U.S. Const. amend VII.) 
Personal and corporate reputations are worth protecting, and the First Amendment 
guarantees not only the freedom of speech and press, but also access to the courts. This Court 
should address Appellants’ case to ensure that access is not irretrievably lost, and before jury 
trials in defamation cases become an irrelevancy. 
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF RECONSIDERATION 
THIS APPEAL PRESENTS ISSUES OF GREAT GENERAL INTEREST CONCERNING THE QUANTITY 
AND CALIBER OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED TO PROCEED BEYOND SUMMARV JUDGMENT IN A 
DEFAMATION CASE, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH FACTUAL ASSERTIONS BY EDITORS ON 
EDITORIAL PAGES ARE PROTECTED (OR NOT) BY OHIO’S PRIVILEGE FOR OPINIONS 
I. Although the United States Supreme Court requires courts to assess summary 
judgment in defamation cases in light of the plaintiffs’ ultimate burden of proof, Ohio 
juries should not be precluded from resolving genuine disputes of fact concerning
falsity and actual malice, particularly where credible experts have opined that the 
defendants deviated from accepted practices of journalism and other evidence 
suggests the possibility of reckless conduct. 
Appellees say there is no reason for this Court to ”revisit the evidentiary burden a 
defamation plaintiff faces at the summary judgment stage” because that question was 
"definitive[|y]” resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 US. 
242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). (Opp. at 6.) 
The majority in Liberty Lobby held that, in ruling on a motion for summaryjudgment in a 
defamation case to which the actua|—malice rule applies, the judge must view the evidence 
presented through the ”prism” of the plaintiff's substantive evidentiary burden, meaning that 
the clear-and-convincing standard of proof "should be taken into account” by the trial judge as 
he or she examines the materials that the parties have submitted pursuant to Civil Rule 56. 
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 254-55. That conclusion left Justice Brennan, joined by former Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, perplexed. As Justice Brennan put it, “I am unable to divine from the Court's 
opinion how these evidentiary standards are to be considered, or what a trial judge is actually 
supposed to do in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id, at 258 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting; emphasis in original). He explained further: '’In other words, how does a judge 
assess how one~sided evidence is, or what a ‘fair-minded’ jury could ‘reasonably’ decide?” 
Id. at 265. 
That is the rub presented by this case and the very issue that the Court should 
reconsider in order to give appropriate guidance to courts below. On the issue of actual malice, 
Appellants (who as non-moving parties, all inferences were due) submitted more than a trifling 
quantity of competent, admissible evidence relevant to whether Mr. Lange may have published
certain false, factual assertions about Mr. Murray and his companies with the requisite degree 
of fault. Even a cursory review of the Eighth District's opinion and of Appellants’ memorandum 
opposing summaryjudgment shows that Appellants presented substantial evidence from which 
a reasonable jury could have found in their favor. For example, the Eighth District failed to 
consider the opinions of Appellants’ expert, Professor Kaplan, in any meaningful way. Professor 
Kaplan, an impressively credentialed professional who reviewed all pleadings, depositions, and 
exhibits, opined that Mr. Lange and the Chagrin Valley Times reporter departed from accepted 
standards ofjournalism in multiple respects. For example, Professor Kaplan noted that had Mr. 
Lange "done proper research or contacted Murray Energy Corp. or MSHA before writing his 
Commentary, he easily would have avoided” inaccuracies in the Commentary. These 
observations are relevant to the actua|—malice question, according to the Supreme Court. E.g., 
Harte-Hanks Camm., Inc. v. Connaughtan, 491 Us. 657, 692 (1989) (upholding jury verdict 
against newspaper that based its reports on allegations of a single source, without attempting 
to verify her claims by interviewing another key witness or reviewing other sources of 
information readily available). 
Unfortunately we do not know how the trial court considered Professor Kap|an’s report 
under Liberty Lobby, or any of the other evidence Appellants proffered in the large summary- 
judgment record. The cursory decision entirely obscures the method. There is similar obscurity 
in the Opinion of the court of appeals. The portion of the Opinion devoted to Mr. Lange’s 
(Opinion, 111] 19-31) leaves that a mystery, just as Justice Brennan worried about in Liberty 
Lobby. It is a mystery worth investigating by this Court, at least so that future defamation
plaintiffs (who already must shoulder substantial burdens) have some clue as to the quantity or 
caliber of evidence that will get them to a jury in this State. 
It has been nearly thirty years since this Court applied Liberty Lobby in a defamation 
case. The Court did so in a trio of opinions issued very soon after Liberty Lobby was decided. 
See Grau v. K/einschmidt, 31 Ohio St.3d 84, 509 N.E.2d 399 (1987); Varanese v. Gall, 35 Ohio 
St.3d 78, 518 N.E.2d 1177 (1988); and Perez v. Scripps—Howard Broadcasting Co., 35 Ohio St.3d 
215, 520 N.E.2d 198 (1988). In each of these three cases, this Court reversed a lower court's 
decision in favor of the defamation plaintiff, holding that insufficient evidence of actual malice 
was contained in the record for a reasonable jury to find a reckless disregard for the truth. 
Taken together, Liberty Lobby and this Court's trio of dated cases applying it in the defamation 
context raise a compelling question as yet unanswered by this Court — what amount or guality 
of evidence will suffice? The substantial summary-judgment evidence unmentioned by the trial 
court here in its ”postcard” decision, and bypassed by the Eighth District (including Mr. Kaplan’s 
expert report, and the other materials cited in Appellants’ memorandum opposing summary 
judgment) provide the occasion for this Court to begin to answer that important question. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 
1472 (1989), addressed how Liberty Lobby and two other Supreme Court opinions issued the 
same year ushered in a "new era” of summary-judgment practice. Street, 886 F.2d at 1476- 
1481 (Citing Liberty Lobby; Ce/otex Corp. V. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 106 S.Ct. 2548 
(1986); and Matsushita E/ec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 89 L.Ed.2d 538, 
106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986)). Street laid out ten ’’principles for ‘new era’ summary judgment 
practice” based on these three seminal summary-judgment opinions (including Liberty Lobby),
then applied those principles to the case at hand. Street, 886 F.2d at 1479-1484. Notably for 
our purposes, the Street court reversed summaryjudgment on certain claims, concluding: 
We determined *** that plaintiffs had not, Micawber—like, relied 
on a forlorn hope that ”something would turn up" at trial. Nor 
were they merely grasping at the straw of possible impeachment 
of defense testimony, or relying on the now invalidated duty of 
the trial court to search the record for some "metaphysical doubt” 
as to a material fact that might be lurking there. 
Rather, they had produced more than a scintilla of affirmative 
evidence *** under the federal substantive law of fiduciary 
relations and fraud under the federal securities or commodities 
law. We found further that plaintiffs’ factual theories were not 
implausible and that a rational trier of fact might resolve the 
issues raised by defendants’ motion in plaintiffs’ favor. Therefore, 
if the same evidence were produced at trial, a directed verdict 
motion would be denied. So then must the motion for summary 
judgment. 
Id. at 1483»84. 
To the best of my knowledge the only time Street has appeared in one of this Court's 
opinions is in a dissenting opinion drafted by former Justice Cook. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio 
St.3d 280, 301, 1996-Ohio-107, 662 N.E.2d 264 (Cook, J., dissenting). This case thus presents 
this Court with the chance to adopt the ten principles the Sixth Circuit enunciated in Street of 
new»era summary judgment practice, apply them to a substantial summary-judgment record, 
and enlighten the bench and bar about what kind and quality of evidence in a defamation case 
qualifies as "more than a scintilla of affirmative evidence" of actual malice. The Eighth District, 
by failing to address the substance of Mr. Kap|an's report, or other evidence Appellants 
submitted on that issue, does not succeed in explaining the basis for its summary judgment. 
Ill Nor, of course, did the trial court 5 postcard" decision.
II. Given that Ohio's unique privilege for opinions is not compelled by U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent, Ohio courts must be cautious of applying Ohio's privilege too broadly 
to factual assertions by editors on editorial pages, lest editors be wholly immunized 
for reckless and damaging factual assertions they make on the State's editorial pages. 
The history of Ohio’s privilege for opinion speech is also worth noting in the context of 
this appeal. I recall that when the Ohio Supreme Court ﬁrst adopted its four-factor test to 
distinguish opinions from actionable assertions of fact, the U.S. Supreme Court told this Court 
that no such test was compelled by the Constitution‘ Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 
19, 111 LvEd<2d 1, 110 S.Ct. 2695 (1990) (”We are not persuaded that, in addition to these 
protections, an additional separate constitutional privilege for ‘opinion’ is required to ensure 
the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment/’) Former Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, who authored Mi/kovich, took pains to explain why that is so, and cautioned that 
”expressions of 'opinion’ may often imply an assertion of objective fact.” Id. at 18. He did so 
using an illustration that bears repeating here, in light of Mr. Lange’s description of Mr. Murray 
as a ”real liar” in the Commentary at issue in this case: 
If a speaker says, "In my opinion John Jones is a liar,” he implies a 
knowledge of facts which lead to the conclusion that Jones told an 
untruth. Even if the speaker states the facts upon which he bases 
his opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or incomplete, or if 
his assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still 
imply a false assertion of fact. Simply couching such statements 
in terms of opinion does not dispel these implications; and the 
statement, "In my opinion Jones is a liar,’’ can cause as much 
damage to reputation as the statement, "Jones is a liar.” As Judge 
Friendly aptly stated: ’'[It] would be destructive of the law of libel 
if a writer could escape liability for accusations of [defamatory 
conduct] simply by using, explicitly or implicitly, the words 'I 
think.’’’ *** It is worthy of note that at common law, even the 
privilege of fair comment did not extend to "a false statement of 
fact, whether it was expressly stated or implied from an 
expression of opinion.” Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 556, 
Commenta (1977).
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19. 
Former Chief Justice Rehnquist’s words remain trenchant, even though this Court 
decided to provide a ”separate and independent” privilege for opinion speech, over and above 
the First Amendment. Vail v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 279, 281, 649 N.E.2d 
182 (1995). For whether one’s conclusion appears in an editorial, or is the result of one’s 
interpretation of the evidence, or is termed an "opinion," calling a person "a liar’’ is still an 
assertion of fact. Cf. "[T]hat which we call a rose/By any other name would smell as sweet.” 
William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act 2, sc. 2. 
Whenever Ohio's "separate and independent” hurdle is raised even higher by cursory 
and unjustified summary»judgment rulings, Ohio plaintiffs seeking to vindicate their reputations 
(not to mention the First Amendment's guarantee to petition the courts...) will find additional 
obstacles in their path to meaningful access to a judicial remedy. 
In this instance, the Eighth District did in fact raise the bar for defamation claims against 
editors beyond what the First Amendment commands and what respect for our jury system 
entails. Although this Court has previously been careful to note that factual assertions on 
editorial pages may be actionable} the Eighth District here concluded that the whole of Lange’s 
Commentary ”is protected opinion designed to convey the writer's opinion on a matter of 
importance in the community.” (Opinion, 1] 30.) Nonetheless, facts are facts. It is beyond 
peradventure that Mr. Lange intended to convey — and did convey — multiple factual assertions 
1 Wampler v. Higgins, 93 Ohio St.3d 111, 132, 2001-Ohio-1293, 752 N.E.2d 962 ("We do not 
suggest here that publication of defamatory statements in a letter to the editor will insulate the 
author from liability in every case/’).
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to the readers of the Chagrin Valley Times about the subject of his "Happy New Year" gift to Mr. 
Murray. One does not :91" that a company was ﬁned the government's "highest penalty" 
for violations that were "determined" to have “directly contributed to" the terrible tragedy at 
Crandall Canyon, even if such assertions happen to appear on an op-ed page. One makes such 
assertions fully intending them to be accepted as facts. And one should do so aware of the 
potential civil liability, under circumstances where personal animosity or bias toward the 
subject can lead to a reckless disregard for the truth. But that liability is really just a mirage, 
unless courts return the role jurles have historically held in our republic to decide disputed 
facts. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, I support Appellants‘ request for reconsideration and urge 
this Court to accept jurisdiction over this appeal. 
Amicus Curiae 
David F. Forte, Esq‘ 
Pro Se
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